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MANDATORY TESTING OF HEALTH-CARE
WORKERS FOR AIDS: WHEN POSITIVE RESULTS
LEAD TO NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1990, the first transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus

(HIV) 1 from a dentist, Dr. David Acer, to a patient, Kimberly Bergalis,

was reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).2 Since then, four
more transmissions of HIV from this particular dentist to other patients
have been reported. 3 This has prompted heated debates in the medical

community over the need for greater precautions to be taken during

health-care worker/patient interactions. 4 One particular proposal that has
received critical notice is mandatory testing of all health-care workers for
HIV.

5

In 1991, three pieces of legislation pertaining to HIV-infected health-

care workers were introduced before Congress. 6 Senator Jesse Helms (R1. HIV slowly destroys the immune system by killing T-helper lymphocytes (Tcells), which cause the body to produce antibodies, as needed. Wayne R. Cohen, An
Economic Analysis of the Issues SurroundingAIDS in the Workplace: In the Long Run,
the Path of Truth and Reason Cannot Be Diverted, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1199, 1203-04
(1992) (footnotes omitted). As T-cells are destroyed over time, the immune system
becomes increasingly unable to produce antibodies. Id. at 1204. Eventually, the body is
susceptible to certain conditions, such as pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and Kaposi's
sarcoma. Id. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is diagnosed only when the
conditions develop.
2. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Possible Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient During an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 489, 489 (1990) (commenting in editorial notes
that no such transmission had been previously documented).
3. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Transmission of HIV Infection
During an Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida,40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 21, 21 (1991).
4. See David Orentlicher, HlV-Infected Surgeons: Behringerv. Medical Center, 266
JAMA 1134, 1135 (1991).
5. See F.D.C. Reports, Inc., CDC Urged Not to Issue Guidelines Establishing
MandatoryHIV Testing For Health Care Workers, 34 BLuE SHEET 7, 7 (Feb. 27, 1991),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Blue Sheet Drug Research Reports.
6. Two amendments were proposed to the Treasury, Postal Service and General
Governmental Appropriations Act, and a new bill was proposed as the Kimberly Bergalis
Patient and Health Providers Protection Act. See H.R. 2622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
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N.C.) proposed Amendment 734 to the Treasury, Postal Service and
General Government Appropriations Act of 1992. 7 As proposed, the

amendment called for imprisonment of, and fines for, any health-care
worker infected with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) who
performed invasive procedures without notifying the patient.8 Although

the amendment was passed by the Senate, congressional negotiators
ultimately defeated it. 9
Senators Robert Dole (R-Kan.) and Orin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced

the Dole-Hatch Amendment No. 781 to the same act before the Senate in
July.1 OThis amendment requires each state, as a condition to receiving
federal public-health service funds, to adopt CDC guidelines in its

licensing laws." The amendment also requires health-care workers who
test positive for HIV either to refrain from performing exposure-prone

procedures or to notify prospective patients before performing such
procedures. 2 This bill passed in a modified form13 and requires each
state, as a condition to receiving federal public-health funds, to adopt
either CDC guidelines or a substitute measure, which it must certify to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services within one year.

4

In the House, Representative William Dannemeyer (R-Cal.) proposed
the "Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Providers Protection Act of
1991."15 This legislation would have mandated testing of health-care
workers on a regular basis and proposed that the patient be notified should
(1991) (both Amendments were adopted by the Senate on July 18, 1991); H.R. 2788,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (bill was proposed on June 26, 1991).
7. See 137 CONG. REc. S9776 (daily ed. July 11, 1991).
8. See 137 CONG. REc. S10322 (daily ed. July 18, 1991); Philip J. Hilts, Congress
Urges That Doctors Be Testedfor AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1991, at AM8.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 102-234, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (the House objected
to the Helms amendment and subsequently both the House and the Senate passed the
Dole-Hatch version of the amendment); Joyce Price, Lawmakers Reject AIDS
Amendment, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1991, at AS.
10. See H.R. 2622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 137 CONG. REC. S9977 (daily
ed. July 15, 1991) (statement of Senator Hatch).
11. See H.R. 2622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 137 CONG. REc. at S9977.
12.
13.
14.
15.
June 26,

See 137 CONG. REc. at 59979.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (Supp. III 1991); see Hilts, supra note 8, at A18.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2.
H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 137 CONG. REC. E3276 (daily ed.
1991).
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the health-care worker test positive. 6 This bill was never enacted; its last
action date was October 31, 1991.17
Because current statistical information suggests that the risk of HIV
transmission from health-care worker to patient is extremely low,
mandatory testing does not appear to be warranted at this time."8
Therefore, it appears thatcontinuing public education and universal safety
precautions are more attractive alternatives.
This legislation and the media attention on the Bergalis case raise
many issues, most prominently that of the health-care provider's rights
versus the patient's rights. This note explores many of these issues. Part
II presents a brief summary of the AIDS epidemiology and current
preventative methods. Part III focuses on the issues raised by mandatory
testing, namely: (1) whether mandatory testing and disclosure of healthcare workers' HIV status violates their right to privacy; (2) whether
mandatory testing constitutes an illegal search and seizure; and (3) whether
the testing, reporting, and curtailment of the health-care workers' practice
is unduly discriminatory. Part IV focuses on other viable options to
testing. Part V concludes that although the possibility of contracting HIV
from a health-care worker is a serious consideration, the government must
not succumb to the hysteria surrounding this issue by recommending
mandatory testing of all health-care workers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Epidemiology of AIDS
On June 5, 1981, the first reports of an illness subsequently defined
as AIDS were made by health-care providers in California to the CDC. 9
As of December 31, 1992, 253,448 AIDS cases among persons of all ages
16. See 137 CONO. REC. E2376 (daily ed. June 26, 1991).
17. See 137 CONG. REC. H8919 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1991) (the last action taken was
to add a co-sponsor).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
19. CENTERS FOR DIsEAsE CONTROL, The HIVIAIDS Epidemic: The First 10 Years,
265 JAMA 3228 (1991).
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had been reported to the CDC. 0 The number of AIDS cases is expected
to reach between 415,000 and 535,000 by the end of 1994.21
The CDC described AIDS as "a viral disease which destroys the
body's immune system, leaving it vulnerable to opportunistic infections

not usually threatening to others."

'

HIV has been identified in blood,

semen, vaginal secretions, saliva, tears, breast milk, cerebrospinal fluid,

amniotic fluid, and urine.' Transmission of HIV, however, has been
linked only to exchanges of blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and breast
milk.' The virus itself can be transmitted through sexual contact,
exposure to infected blood or its components, and perinatally from mother
to fetus.' No evidence exists that HIV is transmitted through casual
contact, such as kissing, handshaking, or the person-to-person contact
commonly found in the work environment.' AIDS is a fatal disease for
which no known cure or successful treatment exists. 27
The presence of HIV is determined by screening tests and
confirmatory tests.' Screening'tests are used first to distinguish between
20. Telephone Interview with CDC National AIDS Hotline (Apr. 16, 1993)
[hereinafter AIDS Hotline].
21. Salwa G. Spong, AIDS andthe Health Care Provider:BurgeoningLegal Issues,
67 MICH. B.J. 610, 610 (1988); see also AIDS Hotline, supra note 20 (stating that the
latest yearly total of reported AIDS cases between December 1991 and December 1992
was 47,106).
22. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Acquired lmmunodeficiency
Syndrome-United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 757 (1986). Such
opportunistic diseases include pneumocystis carinii and Kaposi's sarcoma. "Acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is a specific group of diseases or conditions, which
are indicative of severe immunosuppression related to infection with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV)." CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS
SURVE/LlANCE (Oct. 1992).
23. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Recommendations for Prevention of HIV
Transmissionin Health-Care Settings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 3s, 3s
(Supp. 1987).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supranote 22, at 760.
27. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,AIDS andHuman lmnmunodeficiency Virus
Infection in the U.S.: 1988 Update, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 3
(1989) (stating that "[56%] of all AIDS patients... and 85% of those diagnosed [with
AIDS] before 1986 are reported to have died .... [However,] incomplete reporting of
deaths to [the] CDC results in an underestimate of the case-fatality ratio").
28. Royce R. Bedward, AIDS Testing of Rape Suspects: Have the Rights of the
Accused Met Their Match?, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 347, 350.
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infected and non-infected blood. 29 The least expensive and most
frequently used screening test is the enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay

(ELISA)?. Confirmatory tests, such as the Western Blot and the
immunofluorescence assay (IFA),31 are then used to verify a positive

screening test.' A major problem with the most widely used methods,
the ELISA and the Western Blot, is that they test only for the presence of

HIV antibodies. 33 The period of time between infection and the
appearance of HIV antibodies can be several months, iesuting in a
"window period" wherein an infected person will test negative.'

Both federal and state testing programs are currently in effect in
certain areas, including the employment context.3' The U.S. government

utilizes screening programs in a variety of areas. The Defense Department
screens

all new recruits and active-duty

personnel.'

The State

Department, Peace Corps, and Job Corps screen foreign-service
personnel.37 Furthermore, persons testing HIV-positive may not
immigrate to the United States.3" State legislatures have enacted laws
requiring compulsory screening of marriage applicants, pregnant women,
29. Id.
30. id. ELISA detects the presence of HIV antibodies. See id. at 351. It is the most
frequently used test, but its predictive value, although high, is not as high as the Western
Blot or IFA. See Theodore C. Falk, HIV Testing, 49 OR. ST. B. BULL. 8, 8 (1989)
(stating that "confirmatory tests [such as the Western Blot and IFA] have fewer false
positives than the screening tests [such as the ELISA]").
31. See Bedward, supranote 28, at 351. Patients who test positive with ELISA are
then given either the Western Blot or IFA to validate the ELISA results. The Western
Blot and IFA are more time consuming and expensive than the ELISA. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. ELISA, the Western Blot, and IFA detect the presence of HIV antibodies,
not the virus itself. Thus, these tests only determine whether the individuals were
exposed to HIV, not that they currently have it or will develop full-blown AIDS. See
Falk, supra note 30, at 8.
34. See Falk, supra note 30, at 8 (noting that this "window" ranges from a few
weeks to several months, with two months as the average).
35. See Larry 0. Gostin, PublicHealth Strategiesfor ConfrontingALDS: Legislative
and Regulatory Policy in the United States, 262 JAMA 1621, 1621 (1989).
36. Id. at 1624-25.
37. Id. at 1625.
38. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.4(b)(i) (1986).
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newborns, hospital patients, mentally ill or mentally retarded patients,

39
prisoners, prostitutes, intravenous drug abusers, and sex offenders.

B. The Bergalis Case
Investigation of HIV infection among a group of patients treated by
an AIDS-infected Florida dentist strongly suggested that HIV was
transmitted to five of approximately 850 patients treated by the dentist
through June 1991.1 This dentist, Dr. David Acer, and the patient who
first identified him as the source of her HIV infection, Kimberly Bergalis,
have been given widespread attention from the media, resulting in a
barrage of cries from the American public for mandatory HIV testing of
health-care workers.4 1
These five patients had no other confirmed exposures to HIV. In

addition, the dentist had performed invasive procedures on all of these
patients, and they were infected with strains genetically related to the
strain that infected Dr. Acer. 42 These strains had little genetic variatidn,
which further supports the finding that Dr. Acer was the source of the
infection.'

The concern that these patients contracted the virus from Dr. Acer
through routine dental care may be unfounded because the precise
39. Illinois, Texas, and Utah require premarital testing; Florida and Michigan'
require prenatal testing; Delaware, Maine, 'Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas
authorize testing after documented exposure; Texas and Wisconsin authorize testing of
mentally ill and retarded patients if it changes the patient's social or medical management
or poses a risk of transmission; Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and
Wyoming have enacted mass inmate-screening programs; California, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Washington test prostitutes;
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and
Washington require testing for drug abusers; and California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington test sex
offenders. See Gostin, supra note 35, at 1625.
40. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Recommendations for Preventing
Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus to PatientsDuring
Exposure-ProneInvasive Procedures,266 JAMA 771, 774 (1991).
41. See, e.g., Laurie Garrett, Dentist'sDeadly Legacy, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 15,
1991, at 32.
42. See AMA, Update: Transmission of HIV Infection During Invasive Dental
Procedures-Florida,127 ARcI-vEs DERMATOLOoY 1126, 1127 (1991).
43. See Garrett, supra note 41, at 33.
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mechanism of transmission has not been determined." Hypotheses for
transmission include: (1) Acer carried a particularly virulent and infectious
HIV strain; (2) drills and other rarely sterilized dental tools became
repeatedly contaminated with Acer's blood; (3) Acer infected his patients
deliberately; (4) Acer violated CDC-recommended precautions by not
following strict sterilization techniques; and (5) Acer did not violate
guidelines, indicating that CDC precautions are inadequate.'
Bergalis filed suit against Cigna Dental Health of Florida, the
insurance company that referred her to Dr. Acer, and Continental National
Assurity Insurance (CNA), Dr. Acer's malpractice insurer.' Both Cigna
and CNA settled with Bergalis." Based on its losses, CNA has offered
a one-time $150,000 payment to any HIV-infected dentist whom it insures
who promises to stop performing invasive procedures."
C. Prevalence of AIDS Transmission between
Health-Care Workers and Patients
The CDC estimates that approximately 6,700 health-care workers are
known to have contracted AIDS, and five-to-ten times that many are
believed to be infected with HIV. 49 Current data suggests that the risk of
transmission of HIV from an infected health-care worker to a patient is
low, although a precise assessment of the risk is not yet available.50 It
has been estimated that the chance of a surgeon infecting a patient lies
51
between one in 48,000 and one in 416,000.
44. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 40, at 774.

45. Garrett, supra note 41, at 33.
46. Id. at 35.
47. Two other patients of Dr. Acer also filed suit and were awarded damages of an
undisclosed amount from his medical malpractice insurer. Id.
48. Wendy Melillo, Protecting Patientsfrom Infection: Tests for Health Care
Workers andDisclosure of Their HIV Status Still Debated, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1992,
at 7.
49. David Zinman, The Issue ofDoctors Disclosingif They HaveAIDS: Health-Care
Workers Struggle with Dileimna as Congress Takes a Look at Mandatory Testing, N.Y.
NEwSDAY, Sept. 24, 1991, at 69.
50. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 40, at 771.

51. See Zinman, supra note 49, at 72.
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In addition to the Acer investigation, the CDC has done four other
studies on the possible transmission of HIV from health-care worker to
patient. 2 In two of these studies,
when patients cared for by a general surgeon and a surgical
resident who had AIDS were tested, all patients tested, 75 and
62, respectively, were negative for HIV infection. In [the third]
study, 143 patients . . . treated by a dental student with HIV
infection... [all] later tested... negative for HIV infection. In
[the fourth study,] HIV antibody testing was offered to all patients
. . . [treated] by a general surgeon within 7 years before the
surgeon's diagnosis of AIDS.... Of [the] 1,340 surgical patients
contacted, 616 . . . were tested for HIV. [Only o]ne patient, a
known intravenous drug user, [tested] HIV positive. ... '
It is believed, however, that this patient was already HIV-positive prior
to his surgery.' Due to the limited number of participants and the
differences in procedures, it is difficult to generalize from these studies
and to precisely define the risk of HIV transmission from the AIDSinfected health-care worker to patient. 55
To date, in more than Seventy testing programs throughout the
country, which have tested tens of thousands of patients, only seventy
patients have been found HIV-positive. 56 Many of these patients testing
HIV-positive, however, are believed to have been infected by sexual
contact or intravenous drug use and not from exposure in the health-care
setting. 7
D. Recommendations for Preventing and Controlling the
Transmission of AIDS from Health-Care Workers to Patients
The media attention given to the Bergalis case has generated a great
deal of discussion regarding the best method to prevent, or at least
52. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 40, at 774.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See Malcolm Gladwell, Three Patientsof SurgeonAlso Have HIV, Officials Find
No Evidence that Doctor Is Source of Infection, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1991, at A9.
57. See id.
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control, the transmission of HIV from health-care workers to patients. 51
Both the CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), as well as a few state legislatures, have issued guidelines for
preventing the transmission of the HIV and hepatitis B viruses (HBV) in
the health-care setting.59
1. CDC Recommendations
"[The CDC] recommendations emphasize adherence to universal
precautions that require that blood and other specified body fluids ... be
handled as if they contain blood-borne pathogens."'
These
recommendations were based on the following assumptions: (1) infected
health-care workers who adhere to universal precautions and who do not
perform invasive procedures pose no risk for transmitting HIV or HBV to
patients; (2) infected health-care workers who adhere to universal
precautions and who perform certain exposure-prone procedures pose a
small risk for transmitting HBV; and (3) HBV is a disease more readily
transmitted to patients then HIV.61
The CDC defines an invasive procedure as:
surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of major
traumatic injuries associated with any of the following: 1) in an
operating or delivery room, emergency department, or outpatient
setting, including both physicians' and dentists' offices; 2) cardiac
catheterization and angiographic procedures; 3) a vaginal or
58. See Marlene Cimons, AIDS-Infected Doctors to Get New Guidelines, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, at Al.
59. HBV is the causative agent of hepatitis B, a viral infection transmitted in ways
similar to HIV. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1992) (codification of OSHA's regulations
on blood-borne pathogens); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 23, at 3s-17s
(setting out and discussing the CDC's recommendations); infra notes 77, 81; infra text
accompanying notes 66-84.
60. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 40, at 771 (endnotes omitted). A
pathogen is "[a] microorganism or substance capable of producing a disease." TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1241 (15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter TABER'S].
61. The risk of transmission of HBV after percutaneous exposure is 30%, while for
HIV it is 0.3%. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supranote 40, at 771. Percutaneous
injury refers to an injury effected or performed through the skin. An example would be
a cut with a scalpel. See TABER'S, supra note 60, at 1257.
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cesarean delivery or other invasive obstetric procedure during
which bleeding may occur; or 4) the manipulation, cutting or
removal of any oral or perioral tissues, including tooth structure,
during which bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding
exists.62

Despite adherence to universal precautions, certain invasive, oral,
cardiothoracic, colorectal, and obstetric/gynecological procedures have
been implicated in the transmission of HBV and possibly HIV from
infected health-care workers to patients and are recommended as being
classified as exposure-prone.'
Characteristics of exposure-prone procedures include digital
palpation of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous
presence of the [health-care worker's] fingers and a needle or...
sharp instrument . . . in a poorly visualized or highly confined

anatomice site. Performance of [such] exposure-prone procedures
presents a . . . risk of percutaneous injury to the [health-care

worker,] and-if such an injury occurs-the [health-care
worker's] blood is likely to contact the patient's body cavity,
subcutaneous tissues, and/or mucous membranes.'
With these factors in mind, the CDC has made the following
recommendations to minimize the risk of HIV and HBV transmission:
[First, health-care workers] should adhere to universal
precautions, including.., hand washing, [the use of] protective
barriers, and care in the use and disposal of needles. . . . [In
addition, health-care workers] with [open] lesions . . . should

refrain from all direct patient care and from handling patient-care
equipment and devices used in performing invasive procedures
until the condition [subsides]. [Health-care workers] should also
comply with current guidelines for disinfection and sterilization
of reusable devices used in invasive procedures.
62. CENTERS FOR DIsEAsE CONTROL, supra note 23, at 6s-7s.
63. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 40, at 774.
64. Id. at 774-75. Contact with "subcutaneous tissues" refers to contact with those
tissues immediately under the patient's skin. See TABER'S, supra note 60, at 1646.
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[Second, c]urrently available data provide no basis for
recommendations to restrict the practice of [health-care workers]
infected with HIV or HBV who perform [non-exposure-prone]
invasive procedures . . . provided [they] practice recommended
surgical or dental technique and comply with universal
precautions....
[Third,] exposure-prone procedures should be identified by
medical/surgical/dental organizations... at which the procedures
are performed.
[Fourth, health-care workers] who perform exposure-prone
procedures should know their HIV antibody status....
[Fifth, m]andatory testing of [health-care workers] for [the]
HIV antibody . .. is not recommended. The current assessment
of the risk that [an] infected [health care worker] will transmit
HIV... to patients during exposure-prone procedures does not
[warrant] the diversion of resources . . . required to implement
...
[such] testing programs....
[Sixth, health-care workers] who are infected with HIV or
HBV... should not perform exposure-prone procedures unless
they have sought [advice] from an expert review panel . . .
[regarding the circumstances,] if any, .[under which] they may
continue to perform [such] procedures.61
Four months later, however, the CDC abandoned its plan to restrict
procedures that health-care workers with HIV could perform.' The new
draft of the CDC guidelines proposed that responsibility for preventing
HIV transmission from the health-care worker to the patient would be
shifted to local review panels, which would determine the health-care
worker's fitness to practice on an individual, case-by-case basis.67
65. CENTERS FOR DIsEAsE CONTROL, supra note 40, at 775.
66. CDC Abandons Health-Worker Curbs, FACTs ON FILE WORLD NEws DIo.,

Dec. 19, 1991, at 955. Medical groups balked at cooperating in the formation of the
CDC's list of invasive procedures that heath-care workers would be restricted from
performing because there was no scientific basis upon which to make such a list. Id.
67. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 37

2. OSHA Guidelines
In May 1989, OSHA proposed a regulation to prevent transmission of

blood-borne diseases.' The standard was adopted after an extensive
review by the CDC and OSHA to determine the most effective means of
preventing transmission of all blood-borne diseases in the health-care
setting.'

Under the new guidelines, health-care facilities would be

required to implement an exposure-control plan based on universal
precautions, which would require employers to (1) provide exposed
workers with personal protective equipment such as fluid-proof gloves,

masks, gowns, eyewear,

°

areas, 71

(2) sterilize equipment and regularly disinfect

work
(3) place potentially infectious wastes and laundry in leakproof, color-coded containers and treat all waste as if it were
contaminated,' (4) train workers in proper procedures to prevent disease

transmission and exposure,'3 and (5) provide hepatitis B vaccination to
4
employees free of charge. 7
Although these guidelines are similar to the CDC guidelines, the

OSHA standard has an enforcement mechanism. OSHA has full authority
to enforce the standard through inspections of workplaces to ensure that
employers are in compliance and can impose civil penalties for any

violations.' 5

68. See 137 CONG. REc. S11,320, 11,337 (daily ed. July 30, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
69. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,175 (1991) (amending proposed rule and codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1991)).
70. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(3).
71. Id. § 1910.1030(d)(4).
72. Id. § 1910.1030(d)(2).
73. Id. § 1910.1030(g)(2).
74. Id. § 1910.1030(f)(1).
75. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657, 666 (1988 & Supp. 1990). OSHA has the authority to
issue fines of up to $70,000 for each violation and can also issue criminal penalties
'against employers whose willful or repeated violation of OSHA's standards result in the
death of an employee. Legislation is pending to further expand OSHA's authority to issue
criminal penalties." 137 CONG. REc. S11,337 (daily ed. July 30, 1991).
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3. Debate over Mandatory Testing
The CDC,76 OSHA,' American Medical Association,7" American
Dental Association (ADA),'
American College of Emergency
Physicians,' American Nurses Association,"' and Service Employees

International Union' all support voluntary testing and oppose mandatory
testing.
One of the scientific reasons for opposing mandatory testing is that
besides the Acer cases, no other documented cases of transmission of HIV
from health-care worker to patient exist.' Also, data on HBV, a more

readily transmitted virus," shows that the risk of transmission is
extremely low and is further reduced by adherence to basio infection-

control giiidelines.1 Those HBV transmissions that do occur are
76. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 40, at 771.
77. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(0(3)(A) (1992).
78. See F.D.C. Reports, Inc., Mandatory HIV Testing of PhysiciansRejected by
AMA House of Delegates; PatientsMay Give Verbal Consent, 34 BLUE SHEET 11 (July
3, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Blue Sheet (Research) File. The AMA
supports testing of physicians, health-care workers, and medical students in appropriate
situations following verbal consent. Routine testing may be adopted based on local
circumstances, but not as a substitute for universal precautions against HIV. Id.
79. See Preventionof HIV Transmission:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Health
andEnvironment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
76-112 (1991) (statement of Geraldine M. Morrow, President, ADA). The ADA supports
CDC guidelines and urged Congress to provide sufficient funds to continue investigations
and to obtain scientific information. See id.
80. See id. (statement of Dr. Gabor Kelen, Research Director, Emergency
Medicine, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, representing American College of
Emergency Physicians).
81. See id. (statement of Barbara Russell, Chair, Task Force on AIDS, American
Nurses Association).
82. See id. (statement of Richard W. Cordtz, Secretary Treasurer, Service
Employees International Union).
83. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
84. The Risk of ContractingHIV nfection in the Courseof Health Care, 265 JAMA
1872, 1872 (1991). This commentary was adopted from a conference of the deans of
seven medical schools in the New York City area and the presidents of the major New
York teaching hospitals.
85. Id.
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associated with
failure of, or accidents involving, infection-control
86
procedures.
Additionally, other important concerns bear upon the testing issue. A
mandatory testing policy would remove critically needed, trained healthcare workers from patient care and would send a strong signal to all
health-care workers to avoid care of HIV-positive or potential HIVpositive patients." Furthermore, because antibodies may not appear in
the bloodstream for up to six months after contracting the virus, infected
individuals may not be identified immediately after testing.88 Therefore,
mandatory testing of this group would not necessarily identify all HIVpositive health-care workers nor prevent transmission of the virus.89
Focusing on mandatory testing does little to promote community health;
it merely removes the focus from more important areas such as research
and treatment. 90
The United States Presidential Commission on the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic has summarized the view of those who
oppose mandatory testing by stating that "dependence on HIV blood
testing as an infection control procedure ... for the purpose of preventing
occupational transmission of HIV is not effective and in fact may interfere
with other means of preventing occupational transmission. "91
Proponents of mandatory testing view the issue differently.
Representative Dannemeyer, sponsor of the Kimberly Bergalis Patient and
Health Providers Protection Act of 1991,' argues that caution is the best
way to approach the AIDS epidemic and that mandatory testing of healthcare workers would prevent possible transmission from an infected healthcare worker to a patient.' Recommendations by the CDC for voluntary
86. See id.

87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. 137 CONG. REC. S10,833 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger).
91. PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC,
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS

EPIDEMIC 32 (1988); Sev S. Fluss & Dineke Zeegers, AIDS, HIV, and Health Care
Workers: Some International Legislative Perspectives, 48 MD. L. REv. 77, 78 (1989).
92. See sources cited supra note 15.
93. David Saltman, Dannemeyer Wars with Medical Experts Over HIV Testing of
Physicians, States News Serv., Sept. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS
File. ,
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testing of these workers are viewed as weak and designed to protect those
who are HIV-infected rather than those who are not. '
Senator Helms, another extremely vocal proponent of mandatory HIV
testing, argues that even though only five cases of transmission from
infected health-care worker to patient have been documented, no risk is
too minuscule to ignore when handing a potential death sentence to a
patient.95 In fact, there may be more than five cases, because the latency
period for the virus can be weeks, months, and even years.'
Furthermore, the HIV transmission is not the only health issue to be
concerned with because people with AIDS carry many infectious and
potentially life-threatening diseases, such as tuberculosis and hepatitis.'
Proponents of testing urge that Americans should treat this as a
medical issue and not a civil-rights issue because the health of the country
is at risk.98 Americans were asked whether they thought their health-care
providers, dentists, doctors, or health-care workers should state whether
they are infected with HIV or HBV before treatment.' Ninety-five
percent of those polled said that surgeons should inform them, ninety-four
percent said that dentists should inform them, and ninety percent said that
all health-care workers should notify them before treatment.1°°
Whether one accepts either the proponent's or opponent's viewpoint
on mandatory testing, the legal issues raised by the specter of mandatory
testing must be carefully analyzed before such a program is rejected or
accepted.
94. See id. Representative Dannemeyer believes that the CDC guidelines place the
civil rights of the HIV-infected individual over those who are not infected. He believes
caution is the best way to approach the AIDS epidemic. Id.
95. See 137 CONG. REc. S10,334 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Helms).
96. Id.

97. Id.
98. See 137 CONG. REC. H5203-05 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (statement of Rep.

Burton).
99. See id. at H5204.
100. Id.
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I. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY MANDATORY TESTING
A. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center01 '
Mandatory blood testing, in general, has been objected to on many
grounds in the past including violation of: (1) the Fourth Amendment as
an illegal search and seizure; (2) the right to privacy; (3) due process; and
(4) federal and state discrimination policies. 1 At least one case has
directly addressed the rights of a health-care worker who was diagnosed
with AIDS in the context of a few of these issues.
In Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center," a surgeon diagnosed
with AIDS brought suit against his employer, the Medical Center at
Princeton, after his surgical privileges were revoked and his test results
were disclosed throughout the hospital.°4 The Judge presiding over the
case noted that
[t]his case raises novel issues of a hospital's obligation to protect
the confidentiality of an AIDS diagnosis of a health-care worker,
as well as a hospital's right to regulate and restrict the surgical
activities of an HIV-positive doctor. [It] addresses the apparent
conflict between a doctor's rights . . . and a patient's "right to
know" ... [it] explores the competing interests of a surgeon with
AIDS, his patients, the hospital at which he practices and the
hospital's medical and dental staff. 10 5
The New Jersey Superior Court found that: (1) the medical center
breached its duty of confidentiality to plaintiff, as a patient, when it failed
to take reasonable precautions to prevent his diagnosis from becoming
amatter of public knowledge;-, (2) the relationship between the hospital
and the surgeon with surgical privileges brought the surgeon within the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
Bedward, supra note 28, at 355.
Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1251.
See id. at 1254.
Id.
See id. at 1268-74.
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scope of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination; 0 7 (3) the medical
center met its burden of establishing that its temporary suspension and
restriction of plaintiff's surgical privileges were justified by a reasonable
probability of harm to the patient; 08 (4) the "risk of harm" to the patient
includes the risk of surgical accident as well as the actual transmission of
HIV from surgeon to patient; 1" (5) the medical center, as a condition
of temporary suspension of surgical privileges, properly required plaintiff
to secure informed consent from surgical patients; 110 and (6) the medical
center's policy of restricting surgical privileges of health-care workers
who pose "any risk of HIV-transmission to the patient" was a reasonable
exercise of the medical center's authority as applied to the facts of the
case.1
The American Medical Association has been critical of the Behringer
The Behringer court's standard of "zero-tolerance"
decision.'
(elimination of all risk) permits irrational and invidious discrimination
prohibited by discrimination laws without providing meaningful protection
for patients.' In the context of informed consent, the court's approach
is both unnecessary and counterproductive because the likely effect of
disclosure would be irrational discrimination and would be better handled
by reliance on public-health guidelines.114 Mandatory testing of healthcare workers may be a logical extension of the Behringer decision." 5
107. See id. at 1274-75; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1992)
(providing that it is unlawful to "discriminat[e] against any person because such person
is or has been at any time handicapped"); Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law
Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 21 (1985) (stating that while laws vary, the
determinations, for consideration of AIDS as a handicap, have been unanimous).
108. See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1283.
109. See id. at 1279.
110. See id. at 1283.
111. Id.
112. See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1136 (stating the AMA's viewpoint from the
Ethics and Health Policy Council).
113. See id. at 1135.
114. See id. at 1136.
115. Id.
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B. Right to Privacy
1. Right-to-Privacy Doctrine
The Behringer court balanced the right to privacy of the plaintiffsurgeon against the right of the patient to be fully informed." 6 This
raises the issue whether mandatory testing and disclosure of infected
health-care workers' HIV status violates their right to privacy.
The right to privacy was formulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut."7 The right to privacy is not

expressly mentioned in the Constitution, but is rather a "penumbra" right
derived from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and
is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment."'
In Roe v. Wade,"' the Court found that only rights deemed
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty are included
within this guarantee of personal privacy, which includes activities related
to marriage, procreation, family relationships, child rearing, and
education." 2 The right to privacy is not absolute, and some state
regulation of areas protected by this right may be justified by a compelling
state interest. 121 A state may properly deem safeguarding health,
maintaining medical standards, and protecting potential life to be
compelling interests.

"

In Whalen v. Roe," the Court upheld a statute requiring disclosure
of all names and addresses of patients obtaining prescriptions for certain
drugs." The Supreme Court held that this invasion was not sufficient
to constitute a violation of the right to privacy."z The Court noted that
individuals have a right to avoid the disclosure of personal matters and an
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1268.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484-85.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 152.
Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 154.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
124. See id. at 591.
125. See id. at 602.
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interest in making certain kinds of important decisions.'2 The legislation
here was valid, however, because it related to the legitimate goal of
controlling illegal prescription-drug distribution and reasonable restrictive
controls regarding the use of the information were in effect."z

More recently in Bowers v. Hardwick," the Court spelled out the
limitations on the right to privacy. The Court held that the right to privacy

did not encompass homosexual sodomy and cautioned against extending
the right to activities that bore no resemblance or connection to previously
recognized areas of privacy or to those implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. 129
Recently, cases have examined both mandatory blood testing and the
subsequent disclosure of the results as an unreasonable search and seizure
and an invasion of an individual's right to privacy." 3 This privacy
interest, however, has rarely been found superior to the state's
interest. 131 The Court will employ a balancing test, weighing the

individual's right to privacy against the state's interest in obtaining this
information as a means of safeguarding the public health and welfare.13
2. Mandatory Testing for HIV and the Right to Privacy
The right to privacy is an important element in analyzing the
constitutionality of mandatory testing and in the subsequent disclosure of
the test results. There have been several cases specifically challenging
126. See id. at 599-600.
127. See id. at 598.
128. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
129. See id. at 191-95.
130. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(analyzing whether mandatory drug testing of employees was an unreasonable search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment); see also Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874
(W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that prison officials violated an inmate's right to privacy
when they discussed his HIV-positive test results); Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp.
1567 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that random urinalysis testing of fire fighters was an
unreasonable search and seizure and violated their privacy interest in the information).
131. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986) (holding that the New Jersey Racing Commission's regulations that permitted
urine testing ofjockeys to detect alcohol or drug consumption did not violate the jockey's
right to privacy because horse racing is a highly regulated industry); Plowman v. United
States Dep't of Army, 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that the voluntary
testing and disclosure of the results was not a violation of the plaintiff's privacy right).
132. See, e.g., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
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HIV-testing procedures in which the courts have not been willing to find
a privacy violation.
In Plowman v. United States Department of Army, 33 a civilian
employee of the Army was tested for HIV without his consent, and the
positive test results were made known to his superiors." The Virginia
District Court found no violation of plaintiff's asserted privacy right in his
medical condition because this right was neither clearly established nor
35
absolute.1
In Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v.
Department of State," the District of Columbia District Court found no
violation of privacy when the Department of State required the union to
include mandatory HIV testing as part of its medical fitness program. The
court found that the Department of State had taken reasonable measures
to protect plaintiff's privacy"' and that the psychological concerns that
may arise after a person is notified of HIV infection do not raise
constitutional privacy issues. The court reasoned that other serious
diseases revealed by a blood test, such as cancer, present similar
1 38
concerns.
In analyzing the constitutionality of mandatory HIV testing, other
courts recognize a privacy right but also find a compelling state interest
sufficient to justify overriding this right. In Harris v. Thigpen,139 the
Alabama state corrections department's policy of testing all prisoners for
HIV and substantially restricting the activities of those found to be HIVpositive was challenged bn, among other grounds, being an invasion of
privacy." The court rejected the claim of invasion of privacy because
the state's interest in controlling the spread of HIV within the prison
system and in protecting uninfected prisoners and prison employees
14
provided sufficient justification for these practices.
133. Plowman, 698 F. Supp. at 627.
134. See'id. at 629-30.
135. See id. at 633 (noting that the constitutional privacy right in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters had not, as yet, been extended'to medical information).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
See id. at 54.
See id. at 53.
727 F. Supp. 1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
See id. at 1566.
See id. at 1572.
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In Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court,14 the California Court of
Appeals found that a California statute requiring HIV testing for any
individual charged with interfering with official duties of a public-safety
employee by biting or transferring blood or bodily fluids, when probable
cause exists to believe that the individual's bodily fluids have mingled with
those of the employee, does not violate Fourth Amendment constitutional
guarantees of privacy. 1" 3 The unique circumstances of the AIDS
epidemic, the risk of anxiety and fatal infection to public-safety employees
in the course of their duties, and the strict guidelines under which the test
is performed, rendered the state's interest sufficiently compelling to
overcome the plaintiff's right of privacy against what the court has termed
a "minimal intrusion." 1"
When the constitutionality of test-result disclosure is at issue, the
courtsseem willing to uphold the privacy interest when no compelling
interest in disclosure is demonstrated. The need for disclosing this
information must be weighed against the potential danger to the individual
tested.145
In Woods v. White, 1 the District Court of Wisconsin held that
prison officials who discussed an inmate's HIV-positive test results with
other prisoners and non-medical prison personnel violated the inmate's.
right to privacy. 47 At least one court has extended this right to the
infected individual's family members. In Doe v. Borough of
Barrington,'" a police officer who disclosed to neighbors that an
individual was infected with HIV violated the privacy rights of not only
142. 267 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1990).
143. See id. at 680-81.
144. Id.
145. See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987)
(AIDS victim's interest in acquiring names and addresses of blood donors from blood
donation organization was subordinate to "society's interest in a strong nd healthy blood
supply").
146. 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
147. See id. at 875 (holding that there is a constitutional right to privacy in one's
medical records and that the right "is not relinquished automatically when a person is
incarcerated").
148. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

the individual, but also the individual's family members.149 Because
there was no threat to Doe's neighbors in contracting the disease through
casual contacts, this disclosure did not serve the government's compelling
interest in preventing the spread of the disease." 5°
In looking at the cases cited above, it appears that there is a privacy
interest regarding the disclosure of an individual's HIV status. When the
constitutionality of mandatory testing and disclosure is raised within the
context of the health-care setting, no clear rule emerges. The court must
weigh and balance the health-care worker's privacy interest against the
public's health. Often the court finds the public-health interest to be more
important.
In re the Milton S. Hershey Medical Center 5' illustrates this point.
Dr. Doe, a resident physician in obstetrics and gynecology, voluntarily
52
submitted to blood testing for HIV, and the test results were positive.
He notified appropriate officials and undertook a voluntary leave of
absence.' 53 The hospital disclosed his test results according to strict
guidelines under the Confidentiality of the HIV-Related Information
Act." Dr. Doe's name was given only to physicians in the obstetrics
and gynecology department so that they could notify patients on whom Dr.
Doe had performed surgery or obstetrical care. Notification letters to
patients and media releases did not mention Dr. Doe by name, instead
describing him as an obstetrics/gynecology physician and naming the
relevant period of this service. Moreover, the hospital reminded each
physician to whom Dr. Doe's name was released that the Actprohibits
55
disclosure of that information. 1
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the hospital demonstrated
a compelling need for the disclosure of Dr. Doe's AIDS status based on
149. See id. at 385 (stating that disclosure of AIDS causes a violation of the family's
privacy interest much greater than simply revealing any other aspect of their family
medical history and that the hysteria surrounding AIDS extends beyond those who have
the disease and attaches a stigma to the victim's family).
150. See id.
151. 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
152. Id. at 1292.
153. Id.
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 7607-7608 (Supp. 1992) (limiting disclosure of the
blood-test results to the subject of the test, the physician who ordered the test, and
selected others specified in the Act).
155. Hershey Medical Center, 595 A.2d at 1293.
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(1) the nature of HIV, (2) that AIDS is always fatal, (3) the nature of Dr.
Doe's residency, and (4) his involvement with the surgical team."
Specifically, the court found that "after weighing the competing interests
.. . the scale tips in favor of the public health, regardless of the small
potential for transmittal of the fatal virus."" 57 "[T]he compelling need
to prevent the spread of disease... requires some degree of sacrifice of
confidentiality. " 1 1 In this case, however, the court viewed the disclosure
as "conservative and sound." 159
The importance of the confidentiality and privacy interest of HIVrelated information is readily apparent.1 ° Factors to be taken into
consideration before disclosure include the spreading of unnecessary alarm
due to the significant number of false positives and the resulting ostracism
of the infected individual."' AIDS victims are subject to "social
censure, embarrassment, and discrimination in nearly every phase of their
lives." 162
These factors must be given careful consideration and must be
weighed by legislators when developing regulations pertaining to testing
and disclosure of the HIV-infected health-care worker and by the courts
when deciding whether such regulations are constitutional.
Even with these considerations in mind, it is unlikely that the Court
will extend the right to privacy to prohibit mandatory HIV testing of
health-care workers. The Court would be hard pressed to find that the
interest in protecting the information contained in one's blood is a
156. See id. at 1296.
157. Id. at 1297.

158. Id. at 1300.
159. Id. at 1298.
160. See David P.T. Price, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Charting a Course to
Reconcile the Duty of Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn in the AIDS Context, 94
DIcK. L. REv. 435, 435-37 (1990).
161. See id. at 445 (stating that testing all individuals with the HIV virus would be
astronomically expensive and time consuming and that a significant number of persons
would be unnecessarily quarantined because of false positive test results).
162. Terry Summers, Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of
Retardation: Federal CourtInvalidatesAIDS Policy, 57 UMKC L. REv. 369, 370 (1989)
(citing South Fla. Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985), aft'd, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987)).

362
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fundamental one. 11 Furthermore, if the Court were willing to find a
right to privacy here, it would nonetheless be outweighed by the state's
interest in protecting the public against the transmission of HIV.
In light of recent court decisions, it appears that the invasion of the
HIV-infected health-care worker's privacy interest is outweighed by the
interest in protecting public health-however slight the risk may be.
C. Fourth Amendment-Right to Privacy and Search and Seizure
1. Fourth Amendment Privacy Safeguards
The Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."a
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment." Because the Fourth Amendment is directed
toward governmental actions, the restraints of the Fourth Amendment do
not apply to private entities unless their actions contain a governmental
16 7
nexus.
"The essential purpose of the ... Fourth Amendment is to impose a
standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government
163. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (discussing fundamental
privacy interests and noting that rights arising from such interests are limited to the
state's interest in safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and protecting
potential life; also noting that vaccinations and sterilization are not prohibited by an
individual's privacy right).
164. See id. at 154-55.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
166. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
167. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (holding that private
agreements to exclude persons based on race or color from use or occupancy of real
estate for residential purposes does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; an
enforcement of such a private agreement by a state court, however, violates the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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officials"" 6 to "safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against

arbitrary invasions by government officials." 1" Searches and seizures

must be reasonable." 7 A search usually requires both a warrant and
probable cause to be reasonable.1 1 The Supreme Court has found,

however, that neither is an absolute requirement of a valid search."7 A
search may be conducted on the basis of reasonable suspicion, " but this
reasonable suspicion must be directed specifically at the person to be

searched. 174
The determination of a search's reasonableness depends on a balancing

of the intrusiveness of the search against the promotion of a legitimate
government interest.175 The degree of intrusion is viewed in light of the
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy.176 A legitimate expectation
of privacy is one that is actually held by the individual and is one that
society is willing to redognize as reasonable." r

Searches conducted without a warrant are usually considered
unreasonable, 17 but exceptions to this rule do exist. A search may be

conducted without a warrant if there is a strong state interest in conducting
the search, which includes health and safety regulations or pervasive

regulation of an industry that reduces that individual's expectation of
privacy regarding the subject matter of the search. 79 The reasonableness
168. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (footnote omitted).
169. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
170. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
171. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29.
172. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
173. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
174. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979).
175. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
176. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
179. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600-03 (1981) (finding that because a
legislative scheme authorizing warrantless searches of commercial property, such as
underground mines, is necessary to the success of the regulatory scheme, it does not
necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (holding that because horse racing is a highly
regulated industry, New Jersey Racing Commission's regulation that permitted urine
testing ofjockeys to detect alcohol or drug consumption did not violate the jockey's right
to privacy).
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of the warrantless search is determined by a two-prong test: (1) the action

must be justified at its inception; and (2) the search as actually conducted
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the

interference in the first place."W A search is therefore justified if
reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that the search will reveal evidence
of an employee's misconduct or if it is necessary for a work-related
18
purpose.
2. Fourth Amendment Application to Blood Testing
Certain types of testing, such as urinalysis and blood tests, have been
deemed to be a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.'2 The searchand-seizure doctrine has been applied to a government employer's testing

of an employee's blood and urine for drugs."
The United States Supreme Court has held that the administration of
a blood test constitutes a personal search under the Fourth Amendment
and is proscribed when the procurement of the blood sample is

unreasonable.'

The Court found that blood testing is a reasonable

search method, however, when the government's need to administer the

test outweighs the individual's privacy expectation.'1 The Court has
recognized that blood testing is commonplace and routine in today's
society"

and, for most people, involves no risk, trauma, or pain.' 87

180. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
181. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720-21 (1987).
182. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
183. See, e.g., McDonnellv. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding
that urinalysis drug testing of correctional officers may be performed on a uniform or
random basis for those having regular contact with prisoners); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795
F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (holding that because the
horse-racing industry is already heavily regulated, the random urinalysis drug testing of
jockeys did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507,
1520-21 (D.N.J. 1986) (holding that random urinalysis testing was an unreasonable
search and seizure because the fire fighters' privacy interest regarding information
contained in their urine outweighed the city's interest in maintaining the integrity of the
fire department).
184. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-71 (1966).
185. See id. at 770-71.
186. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
187. See Schmerbt,, 384 U.S. at 771.
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The intrusion in this case can thus be considered minimal and
insignificant."'
A specific doctrinal development in the search-and-seizure context
arises in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n.'19 In Skinner, the
Court held that the government's interest in regulating the conduct of
railroad employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks presented a "special
need" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from
the usual warrant requirements." g The removal of blood for chemical
testing was found to be an intrusion of such a minimal nature -that, under
these circumstances, the intrusion could be justified without probable
cause or individualized suspicion. 9 '
Again, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,"9 the
Court upheld mandatory drug testing of Customs Service employees in
sensitive positions under the "special-needs" doctrine in light of evidence
demonstrating a national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling
narcotics.19 The Court found that testing of employees directly involved
in drug interdiction was reasonable despite the absence of probable cause
or some level of individualized suspicion. 11
Although the intrusion caused by a blood test alone is minor, the
subsequent chemical analysis of the blood sample can reveal a great deal
of medical facts about the individual being tested. 95 For example, a
blood test can reveal whether the individual is infected with HIV. The
courts have recently been faced with determining the weight of the
intrusion in this area.
In Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 96
the state mental retardation agency's Chronic Infectious Disease Policy
required employees in certain positions at the Eastern Nebraska
Community Office of Retardation (ENCOR) to submit to mandatory
testing for tuberculosis, HBV, and HIV or to be subject to disciplinary
188. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989).
189. Id.
190. id. at 620.

191. See id. at 624-25.
192. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
193. See id. at 666, 678 (noting that the customs service did not adequately define
the category of employees who would fall within these sensitive positions).

194. See id. at 670-77.
195. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
196. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988).
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action. 197 The Nebraska District Court held that, given the minimal risk
of disease transmission between employees and clients, the mandatory
blood-testing policy was not justified at its inception and constituted an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 198 The
court balanced the employees' reasonable privacy expectations involving
personal information contained in their bloodstreams against ENCOR's
interest in providing a safe environment for its clients. 1" The intrusion
into employees' privacy expectations was not supported given scientific
evidence indicating that the risk of employees transmitting HIV to ENCOR
clients was extremely low, approaching zero."
In contrast, the risk of transmission has, in certain cases, been found
sufficient to justify intrusion into protected Fourth Amendment rights. In
Government of Virgin Islands v. Roberts," the District Court of the
Virgin Islands held that the Fourth Amendment permitted the compulsory
extraction of the defendant's blood to determine whether the alleged victim
of a rape was exposed to HIV.'
The court reasoned that the
government's interest in protecting victims of sexual assault and its interest
in curbing the transmission of HIV were served by the nonconsensual
extraction of the defendant's blood for HIV testing.'
The California Court of Appeals similarly applied the special-need
doctrine to HIV testing in Love v. Superior Court.' In Love, the court
held that a California statute mandating HIV tests for persons convicted
of soliciting prostitution addresses the state's special need to prevent the
spread of HIV. °5 This special need outweighed the minimal intrusion
on privacy occasioned by a blood test, to which disclosure restrictions
apply, resulting in no violation of the Fourth Amendment.0
197. See id. at 245.
198. See id. at 250. "The medical evidence is overwhelming that the risk of
transmission of the AIDS virus in the . . . workplace is trivial to the point of nonexistence. Such a theoretical risk does not justify a policy which interferes with the
constitutional rights of the staff members." Id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. 756 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.V.I. 1991).
202. See id. at 903-04.
203. See id. at 903.
204. 276 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (Ct. App. 1990).
205. See id. at 664.
206. See id. at 664-66.
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Thus, the Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure doctrine should apply

to HIV testing of health-care workers. Each health-care worker has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained in his or

her blood.

7

In turn, the government has a legitimate interest in

protecting the health and safety of its citizens from contracting HIV from
health-care workers. 8 It could be found that the health-care worker has
a reduced expectation of privacy based on the recent documented transfer
of HIV from a health-care worker to a patient.09 Under the special-

needs doctrine, however, the government would be free to test health-care
workers for HIV without probable cause or individualized suspicion.21 0

If the Supreme Court follows the Glover reasoning,"' because the
risk of contracting HIV from a health-care worker is extremely low, the

state's special need in preventing the spread of HIV may not be justified
at its inception.212 In this instance, both Roberts and Love could be
distinguished because in both cases the method of transmission was sexual
intercourse, 1 3 which is well documented as behavior that carries a
14
substantial risk of transmission of HIV.2

If the Court ignores this distinction and simply follows the reasoning
in Roberts, the state's interest in curbing the transmission of HIV alone,
regardless of the risk, will be sufficient to mandate testing of health-care
workers for HIV. Because the cases dealing with mandatory HIV testing

are limited, it is difficult to determine a clear trend in the Court's
reasoning.
207. See Capua v. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
208. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-04 (1981) (noting that the
government has "a substantial federal interest in improving" health and safety).
209. See id. at 603 (noting that safety inspections that are required by statute are
"sufficiently pervasive and defined that the [subject of the search] cannot help but be
aware that he 'will be subject to effective inspection'" (quoting United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972))).
210. For a discussion of the special-needs doctrine, which states that certain
substantial governmental interests such as public safety present a special need that may
justify departure from the ordinary warrant and probable-cause requirements, see
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666-77 (1989); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200.
212. See supra part II.C.
213. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. at 898; Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 660.

214. See

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,

supra note 23, at 3s.
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D. Violation of Equal Protection and Anti-Discrimination Laws

Once a health-care worker tests positive for HIV, his or her
opportunity to work in the health-care environment may be lost or
severely restricted. 215 This scenario raises the question whether it is
unduly discriminatory for a health-care employer to test health-care
workers for HIV and then terminate or significantly curtail their
employment opportunities if they test positive. This issue may best be
resolved in light of federal and state anti-discrimination laws.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall . .. deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 2 16

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, classifications based on impermissible
criteria that arbitrarily and unreasonably burden a particular group are
unconstitutional. 1 7

Most social and economic legislation is analyzed according to equalprotection standards. 211 The Supreme Court analyzes equal-protection

claims according to three standards. The first standard, minimum scrutiny,

is applied to most statutory schemes or classifications. 219 The Court will

not set aside a statutory classification if it has some reasonable or rational
basis or relation to the purpose for which it is made.
215. See, e.g., Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991) (noting that after a surgeon was diagnosed as suffering from AIDS,
his surgical privileges at the medical center were suspended).
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
217. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924).
218. PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECIsioNMAKINo 549 (2d ed. 1983).
219. See id. (discussing how, since 1937, equal-protection review has paralleled
due-process review in which the Court has used minimum scrutiny-reflecting the
Court's greater deference to legislative actions).
220. See, e.g., Dandridgev. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (noting that "[i]f
the classification has some 'reasonablebasis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply
because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice
it results in some inequality'") (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911)); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949)
(upholding the regulation against an equal-protection challenge because the classification
related to its legislative purpose).
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The second standard, strict scrutiny, is applied to classifications that
are immediately suspect, such as those based on racial characteristics." 1
Such a classification will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and not simply rationally related to, the
accomplishment of a permissible state policy.'
The third standard, intermediate scrutiny, falls somewhere between the

minimum- and strict-scrutiny standards.'

Under this standard, the

classification "must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives" to be upheld as

constitutional.'

This
standard has been used in analyzing classifications
5

based on gender.
Mandatory testing of health-care workers for HIV is best viewed as
typical health and safety legislation, traditionally subject to the minimum-

scrutiny analysis.'

A claim of employment discrimination based on a

positive HIV classification would probably fail under the minimum
"rational-classification" standard. 7 The state could reasonably terminate
or restrict the HIV-positive health-care worker's employment in an effort

to protect the health and safety of its citizens-a permissible state
objective."
In Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. 1,'

an HIV-positive nurse, classified as "handicapped" for the purpose of the
221. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,505 (1989); Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 472 (1979) (noting that racial classifications receive "close examination" but that
Congress is given somewhat more deference because of a special grant of power by the
14th Amendment to enforce equal protection); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 291 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50
(1972); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
222. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964).
223. BREsT & LEviNsON, supra note 218, at 584. The intermediate standard of
review is presumably intermediate between the rational (minimum) and suspect (strict)
classification standards. Id.
224. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
225. See id.
226. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 108-10 (1949).
227. See Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 833
(5th Cir. 1990).
228. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873).
229. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 820.
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Rehabilitation Act, was discharged from the hospital by his employer,

although not because of his HIV status." He subsequently brought an
equal-protection

claim

against

the hospital.

1

Although

plaintiff

proposed that an intermediate-scrutiny standard should be used, the Fifth
Circuit used the minimum rational-classification standard, noting that
"handicapped persons . . . are not 'a quasi-suspect classification calling

for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded
economic

and

social

legislation. ' " 1 32 The

court

held

that

the

"'[hospital's] infection control policies are rationally related to a legitimate
state interest of protecting patients and health care workers from the
spread of infectious or communicable diseases. ' "1 3 Because the hospital
"had a substantial and compelling interest in enforcing . . . infection

control policies,"'
heightened

scrutiny

the court noted that "[e]ven if some form of
were

applicable

to

classifications

involving

handicapped persons," an equal-protection violation would not be
established. 5
To invoke intermediate scrutiny, health-care workers would first have
to prove that having HIV is an immutable characteristic. 6 The state
could then assert that preventing the spread of HIV is an important
230. See id. at 824; see also infra notes 285-98 and accompanying text.
231. See Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 824.
232. Id. at 831 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
442 (1984)).
233. Id. at 832 (quoting Leckelt, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1390 (E.D. La. 1989)).
234. Id. at 832.
235. Id.
236. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (stating that intermediate scrutiny should be applied in the instance of
discrimination against retarded individuals and noting that the "immutability of the trait
: * * may be relevant, but [may not make the classification suspect because] many
immutable characteristics, such as height or blindness, are valid bases of governmental
action and classifications under a variety of circumstances"); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (applying the intermediate standard of
review and finding that "if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of
one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate" (footnote omitted)). But see Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (finding that gender is a suspect class because
"like race and national origin, [it] is an immutable characteristic determined solely by
the accident of birth" and bears no relation to the ability to perform or to contribute to
society).
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governmental objective 37 Because HIV is not spread through casual
contact, however, termination or curtailment of most health-care workers'
employment may not be "substantially" related to the achievement of
preventing the spread of HIV.?5 If this could be proven, the
discrimination would be found unconstitutional under the intermediatescrutiny standard.
To invoke strict "suspect-classification" scrutiny, health-care workers
with HIV would have to contend that they are a suspect class.239 The
proposition that I41V victims are a suspect class has been rejected by the
lower courts.' Claimants would have to prove that they either were
burdened with disabilities, historically subjected to unequal treatment, or
have been denigrated to a position of political powerlessness.2 1 Again,
this claim would probably fail to meet the difficult requirements under

strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court would most likely apply the minimum scrutiny
standard to an equal-protection claim challenging mandatory testing of
health-care workers for HIV. Challenges to such testing would probably
fail because of the legitimate state interest of safeguarding the health and

safety of its citizens.
237. See Government of V.I. v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 902-03 (D.V.I. 1991).
238. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (noting that under
intermediate scrutiny the classification must be substantially related to the achievement
of important governmental objectives).
239. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)'(finding that the compelling
government interest in remedying particular acts of past discrimination may justify the
use of a race-based quota in the construction industry); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that racial and ethnic classifications are
suspect and require exacting judicial scrutiny; the goal of achieving a diverse student
body is sufficiently compelling to justify consideration of race in university admissions
decisions).
240. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1516 (11th Cir. 1991); Codero
v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
241. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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1. Federal and State Anti-Discrimination Laws
The HIV-positive health-care worker could use, the equal-protection
argument within the context of being a "handicapped person" under
federal and state anti-discrimination laws.'2
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 3 (the Act) prohibits
a federally funded employer from discriminating against individuals on the
basis of their handicap. The Act reads: "No otherwise qualified individual
with handicaps in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ... "'
The Act defines an "individual with handicaps" as "any person who
i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 5
The Supreme Court has held that regulations developed by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are an important source
of guidance on the meaning of Section 504 of the Act.m HHS defines
federal assistance broadly enough to include almost any hospital within the
Act. 7 Furthermore, most federal courts hold that receiving Medicare
and Medicaid funding constitutes federal financial assistance for the
purposes of the Act, again placing most hospitals within the provisions of
the Act.24 The Act and the HHS regulations thereunder define
242. See Sonia Ryland, AIDS and the Right to Privacy, 16 S.U. L. R v. 393, 40102 (1989).
243. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
244. Id. § 794(a).
245. Id. § 706(8)(B).
246. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987).
247. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1987):
Federal Financial Assistance means any grant, loan, contract (other than a
procurement contract or a contract of insurance or guaranty), or any other
arrangement by which the Department provides or otherwise makes available
assistance in the form of: (1) Funds; (2) Services of Federal personnel; or (3)
Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property ....
Id.
248. See Spong, supra note 21, at 610-11.

1992l

N07E

"handicap" broadly enough to include HIV.' 9 Furthermore, the lower
courts have held that HIV-related diseases are covered under the Act.='
Therefore, with regard to the Act, HHS regulations, and the lower courts,
1
a health-care worker afflicted with HIV is a "handicapped person."25

The Act and the HHS regulations substantially affect a hospital's right to
implement an employee-testing program: a hospital may test only those
employees who, because of their positions, create a risk that they will

transmit HIV to the patient.5 2
The Court, however, has not specifically decided whether an

individual infected with HIV should be considered a handicapped
individual entitled to the protection of the Act.5 3 In School Board v.
Arline,' the Court held that persons infected with contagious diseases
can be considered "handicapped persons" for purposes of the Act. 5 In
Arline, an elementary-school teacher was discharged after suffering her
third relapse of tuberculosis in a two-year period 56 The Court found

that Arline was a handicapped person within the meaning of the Act
because tuberculosis was a physical impairment and also because her
249. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defines "'individuals with
handicaps'" as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record
of such an impairment, or (ill) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(8)(B) (1991). "Because HIV affects the hemic (blood) and lymphatic systems, the
HIV victim falls into the impairment definition." Leonard C. Heath, Jr., A Hospital's
Dilemma: The Legal hnplications of Promulgating Guidelines Concerning Human
Imnnunodeficiency Virus, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 39, 56 n.74 (1988).
250. See generally Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist., 840 F.2d 701
(9th Cir. 1988) (granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting a school district from
barring a teacher with AIDS from the classroom); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp.
1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting a school district
from excluding students with AIDS from the classroom); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified
Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (granting a preliminary injunction
prohibiting a school district from excluding a child with AIDS from the classroom);
District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(holding that the exclusion of AIDS victims from the classroom on the basis of a mere
theoretical possibility of AIDS transmission violates section 504 of the Act).
251. See Heath, Jr., supra note 249, at 56 & n.74; cases cited supra note 250.
252. See Heath, Jr., supra note 249, at 58. This includes employees engaged in
invasive procedures. Id.
253. Ryland, supra note 242, at 402.
254. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
255. See id. at 285-86.
256. Id. at 276.
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hospitalization for the disease limited her major life activities. 7 The
Court noted that few aspects of a handicap give rise to the level of public
fear and misapprehension as contagiousness does and that allowing
discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical impairment
was inconsistent with the Act, which ensures that handicapped individuals
are not denied jobs because of prejudice or ignorance. 58
While declining to rule on whether Arline was otherwise qualified for
purposes of the Act,5 9 the Court recognized an otherwise qualified
individual in the employment context as one who is able to perform the
essential functions of the job in question.5' When a handicapped
individual is not able to meet the essential functions of the job, the
employer must offer reasonable accommodations to enable the individual
to perform those functions?5' A contagious person who poses a
significant risk of transmitting an infectious disease to others in the
workplace will be otherwise qualified for that job if reasonable
accommodation will eliminate the risk. 2
An individual inquiry must be made to balance the handicapped
individual's right to be free from deprivations due to prejudice,
stereotypes, or unfounded fear with the employer's concern to avoid
exposing others to significant health risks.' Basic considerations in
weighing these interests include findings of fact based on reasonable
medical judgments given the current state of medical knowledge regarding
the nature of the risk, the duration of the risk, the severity of the risk, and
the probabilities that the disease will be transmitted and cause various
degrees of harm.' Although the Court refused to address whether an
individual infected with HIV is a handicapped person for purposes of the
257. See id. at 280-81.
258. See id. at 287-89.
259. See id. at 289.
260. See id. at 288-89.
261. See id. at 287 n.17 (noting that accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes
undue financial and administrative burdens on a grantee or requires a fundamental
alteration in the nature of the program).
262. Id.
263. See id. at 287-88.
264. See id. at 288 (noting that in making these findings, courts normally should
defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public-health officials).
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Act in Arline,' it is probable that the courts would find that HIV is a
contagious disease and thus that a health-care worker infected with HIV
is a "handicapped person."
In light of this decision, a hospital must establish a need for testing its
employees.'
To justify testing employees, a hospital must evaluate
whether the various health-care workers interact with patients in a way
that creates a real risk of transmission of the virus.' If any employees
test HIV-positive, then the hospital must attempt to accommodate them by
placing them in positions that do not risk transmitting HIV to patients or
in which the risk is extremely low.'
Following the Arline reasoning, an individual with HIV could be
found "handicapped" within the meaning of the Act and HHS regulations
because HIV is a physical impairment that limits major life activities of
the individual.' If HIV-positive health-care workers are able to perform
their regular job duties, then restricting or suspending their job functions
would be discriminatory under the Act.27 The hospital would have to
offer other alternatives, such as allowing those health-care workers to
follow universal safety precautions, before restricting their job
functions.27 The Court, however, would probably defer to the judgment
of medical authorities as to whether these health-care workers posed a
significant risk of transmission that could not be reasonably
accommodated, resulting in the health-care workers being found not
otherwise qualified and being suspended from their positions. 2'
The question whether a health-care worker with HIV is handicapped
and thus protected by the Rehabilitation Act basically became moot with
the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 2'
265. See id. at 282 n.7 (noting that the facts of the case did not present the question
of whether carriers of a contagious disease could be considered handicapped).
266. See Heath, Jr., supra note 249, at 61.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 58 n.82.
270. See Arline, 480 U.S at 277 (classifying tuberculosis as a handicap because it
is a physical impairment within meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).
271. See id. at 287.

272. See id. at 288.
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
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By 1994, the ADA will apply to virtually all public and private
employers. 274

Under the ADA, "an employer may not discriminate against 27a5

qualified individual with a disability because of the disability."

Commentators agree that a disability would include HIV infection.

6

employment.' m

Discrimination is prohibited in most aspects of
An
employer could require, however, that an employee not pose a direct

threat to the health or safety of other individuals, including that associated
with contagious diseases, for the individual to be qualified for the

position.

8

A direct threat would be one that poses a significant risk to

the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable

accommodation.

9

To avoid discrimiriation, an employer must make

reasonable accommodations to the known limitations of an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability, unless doing so would impose an
undue hardship on the business.m°
Under the ADA, it is likely that health-care workers with HIV will be

considered disabled.

1

They would be considered otherwise qualified for

their positions, however, because the risk of transmitting HIV is not a
direct threat and can be eliminated by adherence to universal safety

precautions.m
In addition to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, all fifty states and
the District of Columbia have legislation forbidding discrimination in the
274. Id. § 12111(5)(A). For employers with 25 or more employees, the ADA
became effective July 26, 1992, and for employers with 15 or more employees, the ADA
becomes effective July 26, 1994. Id.
275. Id. § 12112(a). Under the ADA, "disability" is defined as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual, a record of such impairment or the perception of having such an
impairment." Id. § 12102(2).
276. See John T. Shannon, Americans with Disabilities Act: A New Era in
Employment PracticesPublicLaw 101-336, 42 U.S.C. 12101 Et. Seq., ARK.LAW., Apr.
1, 1991, at 35, 39.
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112. This includes job application procedures,
advancement, discharge, compensation, and training. See id.
278. See id. § 12113(b).
279. Id. § 12111(3).
280. Id. § 12112(b)(5). This would include job restructuring, reassignment, and
acquisition or modification of equipment. Id. § 12111(9).
281. Shannon, supra note 276, at 39.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
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employment of handicapped individuals in either the public or private
sector or both.' In many of these states, these handicap laws are
applicable to AIDS or HIV infection.'
2. Precedent
A few cases involving health-care workers with HIV have specifically
addressed the issue of an equal-protection violation or a violation of
federal and state anti-discrimination laws.' In Leckelt v. Board of
Commissioners of Hospital District No. 1,' a licensed practical nurse
was fired by the hospital after refusing to submit HIV test results to the
hospital.' The hospital had reason to believe that Leckelt was HIV
positive because he was openly homosexual and was the roommate of an
AIDS patient currently admitted to the hospital." 8 The hospital requested
the results of an HIV test that Leckelt had voluntarily taken.2 9 The
hospital ostensibly terminated Leckelt because he failed to comply with
hospital policies-notably, because he failed to submit the HIV test results
and to call a supervisor when he was not coming into work-not because
of his positive test results." Leckelt claimed that the hospital violated
the federal Rehabilitation Act.191
The Fifth Circuit assumed that Leckelt was a "handicapped person"
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because testing HIV positive is an
impairment protected under the Act and the hospital officials treated
283. See Leonard, supra note 107, at 21; Heath, Jr., supra note 249, at 61.
284. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla.
1986) (recognizing a county employee's handicapped-discrimination claim in which he
claimed AIDS as his handicap); District 27 Community Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (noting that excluding children with AIDS from public
school might violate the Rehabilitation Act § 504 because AIDS fits the definition of
handicap contained in the law); Gostin, supra note 35, at 1628.
285. See Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th
Cir. 1990); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1991).
286. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 820.
287. See id. at 821-24.
288. See id. at 822.
289. See id. at 822-23.
290. See id. at 824.
291. See id. at 824-25.
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Leckelt as though he had such an impairment. 2' The court held that: (1)
Leckelt was not discriminated against in violation of the Rehabilitation Act
solely because of a perception that he was infected with HIV; and (2)
Leckelt's refusal to submit HIV test results prevented the hospital from
knowing his HIV status, so he was not "otherwise qualified" for purposes
of the Act.'
Leckelt also contended that the hospital, by discharging him on the
basis of a physical examination, violated the Louisiana Civil Rights for
Handicapped Persons Act.' This statute prohibits "discharge or . . .
other discriminatory action against an otherwise qualified individual on the
basis of a physical . . . examination . . . not directly related to the
requirements of the specific job or . . . not required of all
employees." ' - Because Leckelt's discharge was based on his failure to
submit his test results, not on the basis of the test itself or its results, the
court held that the Act was not violated.'
The difficulty with applying this court's reasoning to other cases is
that the basis for not finding a violation of either federal or state antidiscrimination laws is that the plaintiff was not discharged because of his
handicap, but because of his failure to comply with his employer's
policy.' The court noted the necessity of relying on the relevant-factor
standard promulgated in Arline,"5 which may be an indication that other
courts, in deciding on AIDS-discrimination claims, may do so as well.
An employment discrimination claim based on HIV status was
maintained by the New Jersey Superior Court in Estate of Behringer v.
Medical Center.' In Behringer, an HIV-positive doctor's surgical
privileges were restricted and ultimately curtailed." The New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination" prohibits "unlawful discrimination against
292. See id. at 830.
293. See id. at 826-30 (noting court could not make determination on Leckelt's risk
of transmission without knowing his HIV status).
294. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2254(c)(5) (West 1980); seeLeckelt, 909 F.2d at 831.
295. LA. REV.STAT. ANN. § 2254(c)(5).
296. See Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 831.
297. See id. at 830 (noting that the request for Leckelt's test results was directly
related to the requirements of his job).
298. See id. at 829 (citing School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
299. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
300. See id. at 1257-60.
301. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West Supp. 1992).
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any person because such a person is . . . handicapped or any unlawful
employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of
the handicap reasonably precludes the performance of the particular
employment."' Both the plaintiff, as a "handicapped person," and the
hospital were found to be within the statute.30
The court noted that the plaintiff established a prima-facie case of
discrimination under the statute because the hospital conceded that the only
reason for suspending or terminating the privileges of the plaintiff was his
HIV-positive diagnosis, a handicap protected by the statute.'
In
assessing the hospital's obligation under the statute, however, the court
held that the hospital met its burden of showing a "'reasonable probability
of substantial harm' if plaintiff continued to perform invasive procedures"
and had therefore acted properly in suspending plaintiff's surgical
privileges and ultimately barring him from surgery.' ° The court noted
that the hospital's actions represented a "reasoned and informed response
to the problem."' It is apparent from the cases charging a violation of
equal protection or anti-discrimination laws that courts will carefully
weigh and balance the health-care worker's employment rights and the
hospital's need to maintain the health and safety of its patients. For now,
it appears that the scale tips in favor of health and safety.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO MANDATORY TESTING
As current statistics show, the risk of an infected health-care worker
transmitting HIV to a patient is extremely low.' °7 For this reason,
mandatory testing of all health-care workers may not be warranted. Many
medical groups and experts have proffered alternative means of preventing
the spread of HIV from health-care worker to patient.

302. Id.
303. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1274-75 (noting that the Medical Center fell within the
statute as a place of public accommodation, that the surgeon-hospital relationship was
within the statute, and that the surgeon suffering from AIDS was handicapped within the
meaning of the statute).
304. See id. at'1276.
305. id. at 1283 (quoting Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarkets, 541 A.2d 682, 688

(N.J. 1988)).
306. Id.
307. See suprapart II.C.
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A broad coalition of health-care and AIDS-advocacy groups argue that
mandatory testing of health-care workers would be cost-inefficient, not
guarantee an AIDS-free workplace, jeopardize the careers of those healthcare workers found to be infected, and deter health-care workers from

treating AIDS patients for fear of endangering their own careers.30'
They believe that educating both members of the health-care profession
and the public would be a more effective approach to preventing the
spread of HIV from health-care worker to patient.'
These groups have offered several alternatives to mandatory testing.

The Infectious Disease Society recommends that the medical community
develop, promulgate, and implement tough infection-control standards

because current programs are "inadequate and underfunded."

3°

One

commentator noted that "[m]ost dentists practice close to the level of that
dentist [Dr. David Acer] in Florida in 1987," and urged the CDC to work
with OSIIA in training dentists and enforcing regulated sterilization

techniques. n
Safer instruments and techniques must be invented. 312 The American

Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)

suggests that the best way to protect health-care workers would be through
313
the immediate adoption of OSHA's blood-borne pathogen standards.
The American College of Emergency Physicians stated that more data
must be collected and more studies performed to determine the exact
likelihood of the transmission of HIV from health-care worker to
patient. 314
308. See generally F.D.C. Reports, Inc., supra note 5, at 7-8 (summarizing
testimony of health care and AIDS advocacy groups at a conference held by Centers for
Disease Control, Feb. 21-22, 1991.).
309. See Marsha F. Goldsmith, PhysiciansandDentistsTell the CDC: "Avoid Quick
Fix for a Tough Problem," 265 JAMA 1221, 1221-22 (1991).
310. Id. at 1221 (demonstrating the "difficulty of maintaining proper vigilance
against the spread of infectious diseases in American hospitals").
311. Id. at 1222 (quoting R. Runnells, DDS, director of infection control,
University of Utah School of Medicine, at a meeting held to discuss the risks of
physicians and dentists infecting their patients with HIV).
312. Id.
313. Id. An AFSCME representative said that at her inner-city hospital, every
health-care worker takes precautions, "[b]ut there is room for improvement." ld.; see
also supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
314. Goldsmith, supra note 309, at 1222.
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The American public was urged to "[s]hift the emphasis on avoiding
infection from where it is rare-the operating room or dental office-to

where it is rampant."31 For example, adolescents should be educated
about HIV and should be urged to wear condoms when participating in
sexual activities.3 1
The American Medical Association and the American Dental
Association both recommend practice restrictions for health-care workers

infected with AIDS.317 Experts disagree on the actual risk patients face
from HIV-positive health-care workers. 1 8 There is general agreement,

however, that the risk must be above a certain threshold before practice
restrictions are appropriate.3

9

For example, a significant risk would be

a risk of death of one per 10,0003 while an insignificant risk would be a
risk of death of one per 500,000. 1
Many believe that these practice-restriction policies send the wrong

message to the general public. 32' Viewing a visit to the doctor or dentist
as a health hazard "would negate health authorities' hard-won success in

convincing the public" that casual contact, such as that occurring with
schoolmates or co-workers with HIV, poses no threat of transmission. 3'

In light of these less drastic alternatives, mandatory testing does not
seem to be the best solution to prevent the spread of HIV from infected

health-care workers to patients. Dr. Mervyn Silverman, president of the
American Foundation for AIDS Research, eloquently stated that this

problem can be solved "'with the appropriate cooperation, collaboration,
communication and compassion."' 3z
315. Id.
316. See id. Many high schools across the country are now providing condoms to
their students in an effort to stop the spread of AIDS. See Bernice Hirabayashi, School
District Approves Condom DistributionPlan, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1992, at Ji; LincolnSudbury OK's Condom Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1992, at 36; New York Goes
First: High Schools Hand Out Condoms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1991, § 4 (Magazine), at
6.
317. See Goldsmith, supra note 309, at 1221.
318. See Orentlicher, supra note 4, at 1135.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Goldsmith, supra note 309, at 1221.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1222 (quoting Dr. Silverman who attended a meeting held to discuss the
risk of physicians and dentists infecting their patients with HIV).
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V. CONCLUSION

The question of whether to mandate testing of all health-care workers

for HIV is not easily answered. The decision to test all health-care
workers must be an informed one. This decision must be made knowing
that such testing could violate the privacy rights of the health-care worker,
could be considered an illegal search and seizure, and could also unduly
discriminate against these individuals in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and federal and state anti-discrimination laws.
In making this decision, the courts and legislatures should not
surrender to the fear and hysteria surrounding this issue. The medical
profession has eradicated many of the myths surrounding AIDS, including
the belief that HIV can be spread by everyday, casual contact.
Implementing mandatory testing of all health-care workers would be a step
backward, toward reconfirming these myths.
It is clear that the interests of the health-care worker must be balanced
against the important health and safety interests of the public. Wherever
the scales may tipthe courts must recognize that other viable alternatives
to mandatory testing exist. Hopefully, the courts, the legislatures, and the
medical profession will react to the facts and not the fear and hysteria
when developing a solution to this problem.
The courts must realize that the small risk of transmitting HIV in the
health-care setting does not warrant governmental intrusion to the extent
of mandatory testing. To find otherwise would be to ignore the right-toprivacy doctrine and anti-discrimination laws. The legislature must focus
on providing proper funding to provide continued research on AIDS,
including methods of prevention and ultimately, a cure. Mandatory testing
is not the answer.
Christine Huebner

